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1 Introduction
Individuals (and organizations) acquire information privately and by form-
ing communication links with others. Private acquisition of information is
costly; similarly, creating and maintaining personal contacts takes time and
resources. The development of modern information technology creates a plat-
form for extensive on-line social engagement: it has a major impact on the
relative cost of these two ways of accessing information. The goal of this
paper is to empirically study the economic eﬀects of this change.1
We use laboratory experiments to study this trade-oﬀ as they allow us
to control the main variables directly: the costs and beneﬁts of linking and
of individual public good provision. We can study causal determinants of
the processes at work. Moreover, we can measure the provision of the public
good and the welfare implications explicitly.
The theoretical framework for our experiment is taken from Galeotti and
Goyal (2010). In their model, individuals choose a level of investment given
by xi, and the number of links with others, given by ηi. Investments take on
a general form and are naturally interpreted as a local public good.2 Indi-
vidual investment is costly: each unit of investment costs c > 0. Similarly,
linking activity is costly: each link costs k > 0. Furthermore, investment
activity of diﬀerent individuals is substitutable: the marginal utility of own
investment is falling in the investment level of connected others. Deﬁne yˆ as
the investment an isolated individual would make.
Galeotti and Goyal (2010) show that every (strict) Nash equilibrium of
this game is characterized by investment sharing. The theory yields sharp
predictions on some dimensions: every individual must access yˆ investment
(own investment and investment from others) and total investment by soci-
ety must also be equal to yˆ, independently of the linking costs. The theory
is permissive on other dimensions: a variety of networks and distribution of
individual investments levels can be sustained in equilibrium. For instance,
at low costs of linking, there exists an equilibrium with a single hub player
acquiring yˆ and all other players forming links to him/her. But there is
1For a wide ranging overview of the economics of modern information technology, see
Peitz and Waldfogel (2012). For a study of the information ﬂows and their impact on
interﬁrm collaboration links, see Frankort et al (2012).
2This framework combines an approach to network formation introduced in Goyal
(1993) and Bala and Goyal (2000) with a model of local public good provision in ﬁxed
networks taken from Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007).
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another equilibrium in which all players make investments and are fully con-
nected with each other. On the other hand, at high costs of linking, only the
single hub outcome is sustainable in equilibrium. One of the main questions
of interest is the impact of changing linkage costs on welfare. It is easy to see
that welfare impact depends crucially on which equilibrium is played at low
costs. Roughly speaking, the welfare improvements are larger if the single
hub equilibrium is played across the diﬀerent linkage costs, but are muted
if the multiple hub equilibrium is played at low costs.3 This multiplicity in
equilibrium outcomes is thus an important motivation for our experimental
work.
We conduct a range of experiments with groups of four subjects. To ac-
commodate the complexity of the strategic structure of the game and to give
players ample opportunities for learning we run the experiment in continuous
time. Subjects can make choices and revise them over time and we have a
random termination time.
We start with homogenous costs of investment, c, and low costs for links,
k. We then compute the level of yˆ. In the experiment, we ﬁnd that all
subjects indeed have access to yˆ units of investment. Total investment in
society is much lower than 4× yˆ: so there is extensive sharing of investments.
In line with theory, individual investments and the number of in-coming links
are positively correlated.
We then turn to the eﬀects of changing costs of linking. As we raise
linking costs, the theory predicts that yˆ remains unchanged. However, at a
higher linking cost, a person must obtain more investment for the link to be
justiﬁed. Given that total investment is constant (across linkage costs), this
implies that there will be fewer hubs and also fewer links. In the experiment,
we ﬁnd that subjects act very much in line with each of these predictions:
the number of hubs and links fall as we raise linking costs, while hubs raise
their investment. Individuals access yˆ units of investment on average, at all
cost levels.
Next we consider a setting with heterogeneity in costs of investment. The
low-cost player i's stand-alone optimal investment is yˆ1 > yˆ. The unique
equilibrium network has the star architecture with the low-cost player as
the hub, independently of the linking costs. In the experiment we randomly
3We note that equilibrium total investment is constant across linkage costs, but that
the number of links vary from n − 1 (in the hub-spoke (star) network) all the way to
n(n− 1)/2 (in the fully connected (complete) network).
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determined one player in each group to have lower costs. We see indeed that
this low-cost player is more likely to be the hub and that individuals access yˆ1
units of investment on average, at all cost levels. The macroscopic patterns
with regard to linking costs exhibit the same pattern as in the homogenous
treatments: the number of hubs and links fall as we raise linking costs, while
average investment by hubs rises.
One important prediction of the theory, in both the homogenous and the
heterogeneous cost treatments, is that total investment acquired is invariant
with respect to linking costs. In the experiment, we ﬁnd that aggregate
investment is higher than predicted and that it increases with linking costs.
We develop an explanation for these two departures from the theory. The
ﬁrst point to note is that in the original model of Galeotti and Goyal (2010),
players make their choices simultaneously. By contrast, in the experiment,
players make choices sequentially and repeatedly, and there is an uncertain
end point. We focus on this diﬀerence: the main idea we explore is that,
toward the end of the game, players explore small and local moves to improve
their payoﬀs. A strategy proﬁle is said to be stable if there exists no small
and local deviation that is proﬁtable, in this sense.
An important feature of the equilibrium outcome in the static game is that
the hub player makes large investments while the peripheral nodes make zero
investments and form links with the hub. In a dynamic setting, the hub can
shade his investment downward, in anticipation of a potential upward shift
in the investment by the peripheral player. The extent of downward shading
is constrained by the threat of a link deletion by peripheral player. Our
analysis explores the bounds on the shading and the level of investments by
the peripheral players. We note that in this situation, the peripheral player
will choose an investment level that is optimal given the hub's investment
choice (so investment accessed by the peripheral player must be yˆ). On the
other hand, as the hub potentially has access to multiple peripheral players,
he/she accesses investment in excess of the static equilibrium level yˆ. This
provides an account for higher than static equilibrium investments in the
experiment. Building on these considerations, we also show that higher costs
of linking imply higher aggregate investments.
The ﬁnal major ﬁnding concerns the welfare implications of changes in
costs of links. In the homogenous cost case (when all players have the same
costs of investment), at high linking costs, there is a unique equilibrium with
a single hub. However, at lower linking costs in addition to the single hub
outcome, there also exist other equilibrium outcomes, with multiple hubs
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and more links. So the theoretical predictions on individual and aggregate
welfare are a priori ambiguous. The data from the experiment yields two
clear cut ﬁndings. Aggregate earnings are below the (least eﬃcient) Nash
equilibrium prediction in all cases. However, they are falling signiﬁcantly in
linking costs.4
To summarize, our experimental subjects behave in line with the predic-
tions of the theory with regard to total investment accessed by an individual
player and on the presence of signiﬁcant linking and investment sharing. The
experiment, however, goes beyond the theory in one important dimension:
it shows that as linking costs fall, investment is more dispersed and it is ac-
companied by denser social networks. This has interesting and large eﬀects
on welfare. Finally, the experiment also yields an important departure from
the theory: aggregate investment is sensitive to costs of linking.
Our paper is a contribution to the literature on public goods and net-
works. In the literature on public goods experiments, an important general
ﬁnding is that individuals contribute more than what theory predicts though
they contribute less than the ﬁrst best; for surveys, see Ledyard (1995), Cro-
son (2010), and Holt and Laury (2012). Thus individual utility is generally
higher than the Nash equilibrium level. The principal novelty in the present
paper is that individual choices determine whether their actions and oth-
ers' actions become public goods or remain `private'. This is accomplished
through the formation of links. The experiment reveals that this `endogene-
ity' of public goods has important implications for behavior and welfare.
With increasing linking costs the aggregate investment in the `public' good
rises, but due to lower linking, every individual has access to the same amount
of it. Moreover, in all treatments, endogeneity of links leads to outcomes that
are worse than the worst Nash equilibrium (in terms of aggregate welfare).
Our paper is also a contribution to the study of social networks. There
is now a large theoretical literature on social networks but the empirical
assessment of networks in economic activity remains a challenge. This moti-
vates the recent experiments on networks (Charness, Corominas-Bosch and
Frechette (2007), Cassar (2007), Callander and Plott (2005), Burger and
Buskens (2009), Goeree et al. (2009), Falk and Kosfeld (2012), Rosenkranz
and Weitzel (2012), Charness, Feri, Melendez-Jimenez, Sutter (2014), and
Van Dolder and Buskens (2014)). This work considers either games on ﬁxed
4We observe very similar patterns with regard to welfare in the heterogenous cost
treatments.
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networks or pure network formation games. The novelty in the present paper
is that we combine both activities and focus on the trade-oﬀ between pri-
vate investments and linking activity. Two recent papers, Rong and Houser
(2012) and Leeuwen, Oﬀerman and Schram (2013) also report experiments
on the Galeotti and Goyal (2010) paper. The distinctive feature of our paper
is the focus on the relative costs of social linking and the empirical ﬁndings
relating to the large economic eﬀects of such changes.The rest of the paper
is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the theoretical model. Section
3 presents the experimental design. Section 4 presents and discusses the
experimental ﬁndings. Section 5 concludes.
2 The network game
The following model is taken from Galeotti and Goyal (2010). Suppose
there is a set of agents N = {1, 2, ..., n} with n ≥ 3 and let i and j be
members of this set. Let each player i choose xi ∈ X with X ∈ [0, X]
(denoting agent i's eﬀort level on the production of a local public good, and
a set of links represented as a vector gi = (gi1, ..., gii−1, gii+1..., gin), where
gij ∈ {0, 1}, for each j ∈ N\{i}. If gij = 1, agent j has a link with player
i and beneﬁts directly from agent i's eﬀort, and gij = 0 otherwise. Suppose
that gi ∈ Gi = {0, 1}n−1.
The set of strategies of player i is denoted by Si = X × Gi. Let S =
S1 × ...× Sn to be the set of strategies of all players. A strategy proﬁle s =
(x, g) ∈ S speciﬁes the investment made by each player, x = (x1, x2, ..., xn),
and the network of links g = (g1, g2, ..., gn). The network of links g is a
directed graph; let G be the set of all possible directed graphs on n vertices.
Deﬁne Ni(g) = {j ∈ N : gij = 1} as the set of players with whom
i has formed a link, and let ηi(g) = |Ni(g)|, the number of links formed
by i. The closure of g is an undirected network denoted g = cl(g) where
gij = max{gij, gji} for each i and j in N, reﬂecting the bilateral nature of
exchange between two players. Deﬁne N i(g) = {j ∈ N : g ıˆj = 1} as the set
of players directly connected to i.
The core-periphery network plays a prominent role in our analysis. We
now deﬁne it formally: There are two groups of players, Nˆ1(g¯) and Nˆ2(g¯),
with the feature that Ni(g¯) = Nˆ2(g¯) for all i ∈ Nˆ1(g¯), and Nj(g¯) = N\{j}
for all j ∈ Nˆ2(g¯). We will refer to nodes which have n− 1 links as as hubs,
while we will refer to the complementary set of nodes as peripheral nodes or
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as spokes.
The payoﬀ to player i under strategy proﬁle s = (x, g) is:
Πi(s, g) = f(xi +
∑
j∈Ni(g)
xj)− cxi − ηi(g)k (1)
Costs of investment are represented by c > 0, while linking costs are rep-
resented by k > 0. The payoﬀ function represents the tradeoﬀ described in
the introduction and the local public good character of private investment.
The beneﬁt f(y) of a player depends on the aggregate investment by her di-
rect neighbors, which is not necessarily identical to the aggregate investment
available in the network.
For the experiment we assume that f(y) is twice continuously diﬀeren-
tiable, increasing, and strictly concave in y, and that f(0) = 0, f ′(0) > c and
f ′(X) = z < c. Under these assumptions there exists a number ŷ ∈ (0, X),
such that ŷ = arg maxy∈X f(y)− cy.
Deﬁne I(s) = {i ∈ N |xi > 0} as the set of players who make positive
investments. Galeotti and Goyal (2010) prove:
Proposition 1 Suppose payoﬀs are given by ( 1) and k < cŷ. In every
strict equilibrium s = (x, g): (1.)
∑
i∈N xi = yˆ, and (2.) the network has a
core-periphery architecture. Hubs make positive investments and peripheral
players make no investments.
They show that as the relative linking costs k/c grow, the number of hubs
decreases, each hub player makes larger investments, and the total number
of links decreases. In particular, if k/c ∈ (ŷ/2, ŷ), then there is only one hub,
and the communication structure takes the form of a periphery sponsored
star. Note that in every strict equilibrium aggregate investment will be equal
to yˆ and is thus independent of the level of linking costs.
Suppose that there exists a small heterogeneity in costs of investment.
Let ci = c for all i 6= 1 and c1 = c − , where  > 0. Deﬁne ŷ1 =
arg maxy1∈X f(y1) − c1y. Proposition 3 of Galeotti and Goyal (2010) es-
tablish:
Proposition 2 Suppose that k < f(ŷ1)− f(ŷ) + cyˆ.5 In every strict equilib-
rium s∗ = (g∗, x∗), (i)
∑
i∈N x
∗
i = ŷ1 (ii) the network is a periphery-sponsored
5The inequality gives us the upper bound on the cost of a link for a high cost player to
link with a low cost hub player.
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star with player 1 as hub, and (iii) either x∗1 = ŷ1 and x
∗
i = 0, for all i 6= 1,
OR x∗1 = ((n− 1)ŷ − ŷ1)/(n− 2), and xi = (ŷ1 − ŷ)(n− 2), for all, i 6= 1.
Observe that a slight cost heterogeneity leads to the low-cost player be-
coming the unique hub player; this illustrates the power of strategic reasoning
in shaping networks and behavior.
3 The experimental design and hypotheses
In the experiment, subjects faced the decision problem characterized
above: groups of N = 4 subjects chose a level of investment and, simul-
taneously, they chose to which other players they wanted to be connected.
The payoﬀ is given by the following function (withX = 29):
pii = (xi +
∑
j∈N(i;g)
xj)(29− (xi +
∑
j∈N(i;g)
xj))− cixi − ηi(g)k.
This implies that (given the network) the optimal eﬀort level xi for a
player i is:
xi = (29− ci) /2−
∑
j∈N(i;g)
xj.
Our design consists of two treatment variables: the linking costs k, and
the costs ci for investment. In the experiment, investments were constrained
to integers. Table 1 presents our treatments, which we label by roman num-
bers in the following.
 Insert Table 1 here 
The baseline treatment
In the baseline treatment, we set c = 5 and k = 10. For these values
ŷ = 12, and the parameters satisfy k < cŷ. We refer to this as Treatment I.
Appendix I provides a proof that in every equilibrium the sum of total
investments is equal to 12.6 With this result on aggregate investment being
6The original results of Galeotti and Goyal (2010) apply to strict Nash equilibrium. In
our experimental treatments we assume that investments take on integer values only and
this restriction allows us to draw stronger implications and show that aggregate investment
is equal to yˆ = 12 in every equilibrium (and not just in the strict equilibrium).
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equal to yˆ = 12, we then apply Proposition 1 in Galeotti and Goyal (2010)
to provide a complete characterization of equilibria. Figure 1 presents the
key features of equilibrium outcomes.
 Insert Figure 1 here 
There are multiple equilibria possible but they share some key macro-
scopic properties: there is investment sharing in all of them, every individ-
ual accesses 12 units of investment, and aggregate investment in society is
also 12. There is positive correlation between level of individual investment
and the number of others who link with this person (her in-degree). The-
ory also predicts individual earnings to vary greatly within an equilibrium
and also across equilibria. Finally, aggregate earnings are predicted to also
vary greatly across equilibria (see Table 3). Due to the rather high level of
complexity in our experiment (groups of 4, two strategic variables, multiple
equilibria) we do not expect subjects to easily coordinate on equilibria. This
leads us to focus on the impact of relative cost of investments and linking
on individual investments and the macroscopic features of the network (the
number of links and the welfare).
Linking costs
A key aspect of the model is the comparison of linking costs and the costs
of investment. To explore the role of this comparison we vary the linking
costs. We raise the costs from k = 10 to k = 24 and then to k = 36; we
refer to these as Treatments II and III. Figure 1 provides a characterization of
equilibrium outcomes. In Treatment II, with k = 24, an equilibrium contains
either 1 hub with 3 links or 2 hubs with 4 links. Investment by a hub must
be at least 4.8 to justify linking by peripheral players. In Treatment III,
with k = 36, an equilibrium contains 1 hub and 3 links. Investment by the
hub must exceed 7.2. Across these cost levels, individuals access exactly
ŷ = 12 units of investment and aggregate investment remains at 12. For easy
reference all equilibrium values including earnings are presented in Table 3.
These observations yield our ﬁrst hypothesis on the comparisons across
Treatment I, II and III.
Hypothesis 1: With homogenous costs of investment an increase in link-
ing costs (a) reduces the number of hubs, (b) raises investments by hubs,
8
and (c) reduces the number of links, while (d) aggregate investment remains
unchanged and (e) aggregate earnings fall.
Heterogeneity in costs of investment
To understand the importance of heterogeneity among players for the
emergence of core-periphery structures, we consider the role of heterogeneity
in costs for investment across individuals. Suppose ci = 5 for all i 6= 1 and
c1 = c − , where  = 2. We allow for the same three levels of linking costs
as in the homogeneous treatments, i.e. k = {10, 24, 36}. We refer to these
heterogeneous treatments as Treatments IV-VI. It follows that the low-cost
player's stand-alone optimal investment is ŷ1 = 13. Moreover, k < f(ŷ1) −
f(ŷ)+cŷ, which in combination with the discrete action space implies that the
unique equilibrium network is a periphery-sponsored star and the low-cost
player is the hub, investing ŷ1, irrespective of the linking costs. The proof of
this property is presented in Appendix I. Figure 1 provides a characterization
of equilibrium outcomes. Our second hypothesis operationalizes Proposition
2 and refers to a comparison between Treatment I and IV (k = 10).7
Hypothesis 2: If linking costs are low (k = 10), heterogeneity with respect
to costs of investment specialization: (a) the low-cost player is the hub. More-
over, heterogeneity (b) reduces the number of hubs, (c) raises investment by
hubs, and (d) lowers the number of links, and (e) raises aggregate investment.
Note that part (e) is a direct consequence of the fact that with heteroge-
neous players the low-cost player is the unique hub whose optimal investment,
which is identical to aggregate investment, is larger due to his lower costs.
3.1 Experimental procedures
The computerized experiment was designed using the software program z-
tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted in the Experimental Laboratory for
Sociology and Economics (ELSE) at Utrecht University. In total, eight exper-
imental sessions of approximately one-and-a-half hours were scheduled and
7For Hypothesis 2, we focus on the benchmark cost k = 10; in other words, we compare
treatment I and IV. This comparison that oﬀers the greatest contrast: with homogenous
costs networks with 1-4 hubs may arise in equilibrium while there is a network with a
unique hub in the heterogenous costs case. For higher links costs, the impact of cost
heterogeneity is much smaller.
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completed. Before the start of every experiment, general written instructions
were given, which were kept identical across sessions (see Appendix II).
Using the ORSEE recruitment system (Greiner, 2004), over 1000 poten-
tial subjects were approached by e-mail to participate in the experiment. A
total of 152 subjects (either 16 or 20 per session) participated. Each subject
played 24 rounds of a local public goods game with linking decisions. Sub-
jects were informed about the fact that at the beginning of each round, they
were randomly allocated to a group together with three other participants.
This resulted in 152/4 = 38 observations at the group level per round. Sub-
jects were indicated as circles on the screen and could identify themselves by
color: each subject saw him- or herself as a blue circle while all other mem-
bers of the same group were represented as black circles (see screen shots
in Appendix II). In the heterogeneous treatments the low-cost player was
determined randomly at the beginning of reach round and on the screen this
player was marked with an additional square. Subjects could see investment
levels and links as well as proﬁts of all other players all the time. The identity
of the subjects was not identiﬁable between diﬀerent rounds or at the end of
the experiment.8
In each session we ran every treatment. The order of the treatments was
balanced across sessions.9 Each of the six treatments I - VI described in
the previous section was played for 4 rounds: 1 trial round and 3 payment
rounds. As we did not use the data of the trial round in our analysis, this
ultimately led to 114 (= 38 groups × 3 rounds) observations at the group
level per treatment. Moreover, we obtained 456 (= 38 groups × 3 payed
rounds × 4 players) observations at an individual level.
Every round had the same structure and lasted between 105 and 135
seconds (on average 120.5 seconds). This was communicated to subjects at
the start of the experiment and again at the point of 105 seconds. Starting
from a situation with no investments and no links, subjects indicated simul-
taneously on their computer terminals (by clicking on one of two buttons at
the bottom of the screen) how much (expressed in "points") they wished to
invest. By clicking on one of the circles on the screen representing another
participant, subjects could link to this other participant. A one-headed ar-
row appeared to indicate the link and its direction. By clicking again on
8The aim of this allocation mechanism is to minimize the dependence across observa-
tions (Falk and Kosfeld, 2012).
9See Table 9 in Appendix II for the sequence of the treatments.
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the other participant the arrow and, thus, the link was removed again. The
participant who initiated this link had to pay some points for this link. If
both participants had clicked for a speciﬁc link a two-headed arrow appeared
and both participants needed to pay points for this link.
We note that, during the experiment, full information about the invest-
ments and linking decisions of all other subjects was continuously provided.
Also, resulting payoﬀs of all participants could continuously be observed on
the screen. At the end of each round, subjects were informed about the num-
ber of points earned with the investments and links as were on the screen at
the end of that round. In other words, subject earnings only depended on
the situation at the (random) end of every round.
It is important to clarify some aspects of the experimental design.
Our ﬁrst remark concerns the complexity of the game and the need for
trial time: Experience with previous experiments on network formation sug-
gests that individuals ﬁnd the decision problem to be very complex and this
inhibits behavior (Goeree et al., 2009; Falk and Kosfeld, 2012). Subjects
appear to need time to understand the game and to coordinate their actions.
We address this issue in our design by having a trial round (non-payoﬀ rele-
vant) at the beginning of each treatment, and, in addition, by starting each
round with a trial period of 105 seconds where actions do not have payoﬀ
implications. Moreover, to facilitate activity, we allowed subjects to choose
links and investment levels in continuous time.
Our second remark concerns the end of the time interval between 105 and
135 seconds: while a random end may induce players in a disadvantageous
equilibrium position to try to move play towards a more advantageous equi-
librium if the interval is still long enough, a ﬁxed end may turn the game into
an unpredictable waiting game in which players are likely to mis-coordinate
during the ﬁnal stage. After an internal test session we considered the second
eﬀect to be more severe.
The third set of remarks is about the relation between the theoretical
model discussed in Section 2, and the experimental design.
A general observation is that design departs in many ways from the static
model studied by Galeotti and Goyal (2010). This departure was in some
cases motivated by considerations of complexity of the game, as discussed
above. But it is important to emphasize a more general methodological
point: our goal in this paper is to examine the economic implications of
the trade-oﬀ between costs of linking and the costs of personal investment
as alternative routes to being well informed. Our view is that if the trade-
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oﬀs identiﬁed in the theoretical paper are robust then they should also be
reﬂected in an experimental design that departs in some dimensions from the
static model. With this general observation in place, we now take up some
more speciﬁc points.
We may consider our experimental design as a sequence of simultaneous
move games, with a stochastic end stage, and only the last stage behavior
to be payoﬀ relevant. In such an interpretation, it follows from standard
arguments that any equilibrium of the stage game can be implemented in
the stage game of our experiment.
Players know that activity in the ﬁrst 105 seconds has no (direct) payoﬀ
relevance: actions in this period may therefore be viewed as `cheap talk'. This
raises the question of whether this cheap talk can select between diﬀerent
equilibria of the stage game. There is a large literature on this subject: a
general message is that cheap talk is more likely to be eﬀective in equilibrium
selection if equilibria are Pareto ranked (see e.g., Farrell and Rabin (1996)).
In our setting, equilibria are not Pareto ranked. So we believe that cheap
talk is not helpful in selecting equilibria in our analysis.
The ﬁnal remark is about the potential repeated game eﬀects. The pe-
riod from 105 seconds until the end of the game may be viewed as a type
of `repeated game', with an ending that is stochastic with a well deﬁned
ﬁnite end point (at 135 seconds). From the work of Benoˆıt and Krishna
(1985), we know that repetition may be used to select among diﬀerent stage
game equilibrium and indeed even go beyond stage game equilibrium  to
Pareto improving proﬁles of actions. This is certainly a possibility in our
experimental design. We come back to this issue in section 4.3. below.10
At the end of the experiment, points were converted to Euros at a rate
of 200 points = Euro 1. The total was then rounded upwards to Euro 0.5.
On average, the experiment lasted 80 minutes and subjects earned Euro
14.40. At the end of the experiment, subjects were asked to ﬁll in a short
questionnaire about their demographic proﬁles.
10There is also the possibility that once play settles on a stage game equilibrium a player
who is disadvantaged (such as the hub) may choose to signal a move to a diﬀerent stage
game equilibrium though a deviation in personal investment. This sort of dynamic can
probably be accommodated within an equilibrium but would require a much richer model.
While this dynamic might be at work we believe that our main results  which pertain to
the eﬀects of falling linking costs are robust to this dynamic as it is common across all
our treatments.
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4 Experimental ﬁndings
4.1 Description of sample and variables
Table 2 describes the sample across all sessions and treatments.11 On average,
a subject contributed 4.4 units, invested in 1.03 links to other players (out-
degree) and had 1.03 other players linking to her (in-degree). On average, a
period lasted 120.5 seconds during which a subject took 24.7 linking decisions
and 52 investment decisions. Thus, the experiment was characterized by high
level of activity in both investment and linking decisions.
 Insert Table 2 here 
Table 3 provides a summary of investments and linking per treatment, and
reports proﬁts at the individual and at the group level. In the following
subsection, we use these variables and the diﬀerences between treatments,
and report the relevant statistical analyses to test our hypotheses.12
 Insert Table 3 here 
With respect to individual investment, Table 3 shows that in line with
theory the median player accesses exactly 12 units of investment, while the
average access is 12.693 units. Although this average access is statistically
diﬀerent from ŷ = 12 (two-tailed t-test, p < 0.01), its deviation is less than
1 unit from the predicted value, which was the minimum increment in the
experiment. Also for the heterogeneous treatments, in line with theory we
observe that individuals, in the median, access 13 units of investment re-
gardless of the level of linking costs.13 For the average we also ﬁnd that it
is statistically not diﬀerent from the theoretically predicted value of ŷ1 = 13
(two-tailed t-test, p = 0.229, in Treatment IV). In Table 3, we observe for
the baseline Treatment I, a mean total investment per group of 15.175 units,
11Approximately 65% of the 152 subjects participating in the experiment were female
and 62% were Dutch. On average, a subject knew 0.7 other people in the lab by ﬁrst name
(`friends'), and was 21.3 years old.
12Treatments V and VI are robustness checks for Treatment IV.
13Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for the equality of medians show that the accessed levels
of investment for k = 24 and k = 36 do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly (z = 0.455) and only at
z = 0.093 for k = 10 and k = 24. Two-sample t-tests for a comparison of the averages
show a similar pattern with a p = 0.438 for k = 24 versus k = 36, and p = 0.002 for k = 10
versus k = 24.
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which is signiﬁcantly higher than the theoretically predicted level of ŷ = 12.14
Figure 2 presents the distribution of investments accessed in Treatments I
and IV.
 Insert Figure 2 here 
While total investment in society is larger than predicted, it still is much
lower than 48 units, the level that would prevail if every individual would
choose its optimal level independently. As each individual, on average, has
access to approximately 12 units of investment, this means that there is
considerable sharing of investment among individuals.
This insight is conﬁrmed by an analysis of the relation between an indi-
vidual's investment and her in-degree, i.e. the number of directed, incoming
links from other individuals. Figure 3 presents a box plot on this relation, i.e.
the average node investment (for xi < 19, corresponding to 99% of all obser-
vations) per node in-degree (x-axis). Non-parametric and parametric tests
of pairwise correlation show that investment is indeed signiﬁcantly higher for
players with a higher in-degree.15
 Insert Figure 3 here 
To get more insight into investment sharing we next analyze the network
structure. A direct examination of linking patterns reveals that the network
is connected in over 90% of the cases, see Table 4. Table 2 shows that there
is signiﬁcant linking activity (in all treatments).16
 Insert Table 4 here 
14Our statistical tests (a two-tailed t-test, a Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test
for the equality of medians, and a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the equality of distribution
functions) conﬁrm that aggregate investment is statistically signiﬁcantly higher than 12
at a 99% level of conﬁdence.
15The Pearson correlation coeﬃcient between in-degree and investment at a 1% level
of statistical signiﬁcance (99% CI) is 0.4196 for the homogeneous Treatments I-III, and
0.4409 for the heterogeneous Treatments IV-VI. The positive correlation between in-degree
and investment is also conﬁrmed in an OLS regression, with investment as the dependent
variable, and in-degree and all levels of linking costs k as independent variables. This is
reported in Table 10, in Appendix II, where Model 1 in the ﬁrst column presents the data
from the baseline Treatment I (k = 10, c = 5).
16Although equilibrium outcomes arise very rarely in the laboratory, 25.4% of all groups
are in a network structure as described by equilibrium (for evidence on this refer to Table
11 in Appendix II).
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Taken together, these observations oﬀer strong support for investment
sharing in the laboratory. Finally, from Table 3 we note that aggregate
earnings of subjects are typically lower than the lowest equilibrium payoﬀs.
However, we do observe a signiﬁcant fall in aggregate earnings as we raise
the costs of linking from k = 10 to k = 36.
4.2 Hypotheses testing
We now turn to the central question regarding the impact of changing
linking costs. Hypothesis 1 predicts (for the homogeneous treatments) that
an increase in linking costs (a) reduces the number of hubs, (b) raises in-
vestments by hubs, and (c) reduces the number of links, while (d) aggregate
investment remains unchanged and (e) aggregate earnings fall.
The theory deﬁnes a hub as a player who invests xi > k/c, such that other
players ﬁnd it worthwhile to link to this player. For k = 10, 24, 36 and c = 5,
these critical investment levels are 2, 4.8, and 7.2, respectively. Note that, to
test whether the investment by hubs increases with rising linking costs, we
should not use a deﬁnition that is based on rising investment thresholds, as
this would bias our estimates. We therefore use a deﬁnition that is based on
a player's incoming links (in-degree). We deﬁne someone as 'Hub2' if she has
an in-degree larger than or equal to 2, and someone as 'Hub3' if she has an
in-degree larger than or equal to 3. While the ﬁrst deﬁnition is in line with
the equilibrium predictions for the treatments k = {10, 24}, it is too lenient
for k = 36. The second deﬁnition is in line with the theoretical predictions
for treatment k = 36. It also allows for a conservative test of our theory
when applied to the other two treatments.
In Table 5, the columns 'Hub2' and 'Hub3' show the number of players
qualifying as a hub, as well as the average number of hubs per group. Overall,
we ﬁnd clear evidence for a decline in the number of hubs when linking costs
increase from k = 10 to k = 24 or k = 36 (Hub2) and from k = 10 or k = 24
to k = 36 (Hub3), largely supporting Hypothesis 1(a).17
17Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests comparing the number of hubs in one treatment with the
remaining two levels of k, show that there are signiﬁcantly more subjects with an in-degree
of at least 2 (Hub2) when k = 10 compared with k = 24 or k = 36 (statistically signiﬁcant
with a 99% CI). There is, however, no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the treatments with
k = 24 and k = 36. At the same time we ﬁnd that signiﬁcantly fewer subjects had an
in-degree of 3 (Hub3) when k = 36 compared with k = 24 or k = 10 (diﬀerences are
signiﬁcant with a 99% CI). We do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the treatments
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Table 5 shows investment subjects that qualify as a Hub2 or as a Hub3:
for both hub deﬁnitions investment levels for k = 24 and for k = 36 are
signiﬁcantly higher than for k = 10 (99% CI), while the investment levels for
k = 24 and k = 36 do not diﬀer statistically.18 Thus, we interpret this as
support for Hypothesis 1(b).19
 Insert Table 5 here 
We next turn to the number of links. Table 3 on group descriptives
reports the mean (and median) number of directed ties per group. We see
that there are 5, 4 and 3 links as we vary costs of linking from k = 10 to
k = 36. Conﬁrming Hypothesis 1(c), we ﬁnd that higher levels of linking
costs are associated with lower levels of linking.20
We next consider aggregate investment. Table 3 reveals that it is growing
with cost of linking: in the homogeneous treatments, it is, on average, 15.175
at k = 10, rises to 17.588 at k = 24 and then rises further to 19.465 at
k = 36. This rise of aggregate investment is statistically signiﬁcant at a
95% level of conﬁdence (for t-tests, the Wilcoxon rank-sum tests as well
as a Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests across levels of k). With the same tests
we also conﬁrm statistically that aggregate investment is higher than 12 at
a 99% level of conﬁdence. This is a clear departure from the theoretical
prediction in Hypothesis 1(d). However, note that, as theoretically predicted
(see Proposition 1 and Figure 1), the mean and median individually accessed
investment does not change in the level of linking costs k.21 We provide an
with k = 10 and k = 24.
18Table 10 in Appendix II shows a positive correlation between in-degree and investment
in general. Model 2 shows the estimations for the data from the heterogeneous Treatment
IV with k = 10, Model 3 for all data from the homogeneous Treatments I-III pooled,
Model 4 for all data from the heterogeneous Treatments IV-VI, and Model 5 for all data
of the full sample (Treatments I-VI) pooled. In Models 3 to 5, dummies for the treatments
with linking costs k = 10 and k = 36 are added. The results show that with lower linking
costs, k = 10, individual investment is lower. The dummy for k = 36 in Model 3 is close to
statistical signiﬁcance with a t-value (p-value) of 1.565 (0.118) when compared to k = 24.
19Note that theory does not predict a speciﬁc slope for the increase of investments by
hubs. According to Table 5 such a slope is likely to be concave: we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
increase in hub investments as costs of linking move from k = 10 to k = 24, which then
levels out between k = 24 and k = 36.
20A Wilcoxon rank-sum test (and also the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test) shows that the
respective diﬀerences are signiﬁcant for k = 24 (k = 36) and k = 10 (99% CI), and for
k = 24 and k = 36 (95% CI).
21T -tests show p-values of 0.187 and 0.631 for a comparison of averages across levels of
16
explanation for the deviation concerning aggregate investment in Section 4.3
below.
Finally, we consider aggregate earnings. Recall that at k = 10 and at
k = 24 there are multiple equilibria (with possibly 1-4 hubs and 1-2 hubs,
respectively), while at k = 36 there exists a unique equilibrium (with a
single hub). As aggregate investment is constant at 12 in all cases aggregate
earnings are falling in the number of links in an equilibrium: the equilibrium
with a single hub is eﬃcient. If we focus on the eﬃcient equilibrium then it
is easy to check that aggregate earnings will fall by 78 as the costs of linking
increase from k = 10 all the way to k = 36. This is the maximum decline
in equilibrium earnings possible as we raise costs of linking. On the other
hand, the minimum fall in earnings is 48 and corresponds to the case when
players choose the 4-Star equilibrium when k = 10. Table 3 reports the
movement in aggregate earnings across diﬀerent linking cost treatments. We
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant drop in median earnings − from 680 to 611 − as we raise
costs from k = 10 to k = 36.22 Thus the experiment supports Hypothesis
1(e), aggregate welfare are falling sharply in costs of linking.
We next turn to eﬀects of heterogeneity in the costs of investment. Hy-
pothesis 2 predicts that, if linking costs are low (k = 10), heterogeneity with
respect to costs of investment increases specialization: (a) the low-cost player
is the hub. Moreover, heterogeneity (b) reduces the number of hubs, (c) raises
investment by hubs, and (d) lowers the number of links when compared to the
homogeneous case, while (e) aggregate investment rises.
First we test whether the low-cost player is a hub player. Here we fol-
low the theoretical prediction for the heterogeneous treatments and focus
on Hub3 (someone who has an in-degree equal to 3), because the deﬁnition
of Hub2 would be too lenient and bias our results in favour of the theory.
Table 6 presents logistic estimations for Treatment IV and for all heteroge-
neous Treatments IV-VI with a dummy for Hub3 as the dependent variable
(Columns 1 and 3). As our most important variable of interest we include
a dummy for the low-cost player as explanatory variable.23 For robustness,
k = 10 and k = 24, and of k = 24 and k = 36, respectively. The corresponding z-values
of Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for the equality of medians are z = 0.328 and z = 0.861,
respectively.
22This fall of aggregate earnings is statistically signiﬁcant at a 99% level of conﬁdence
across all levels of k (Wilcoxon rank-sum test as well as a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test).
23All control variables of the econometric speciﬁcation in Table 10 are also included in
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Table 6 also reports all estimations for Hub2 (Columns 2 and 4). The results
of all econometric speciﬁcations clearly conﬁrm Hypothesis 2(a): for a low-
cost player the odds of being a Hub3 (or Hub2) are 5.692 (or 4.152) times
larger than for high-cost players.
 Insert Table 6 here 
We further examine the eﬀect of cost heterogeneity on the number of hubs.
Table 5 shows that the average number of players per group that qualify as
a Hub3 in the heterogeneous Treatment IV is 0.693, but not signiﬁcantly
lower than the corresponding average in the homogeneous baseline treatment
(0.684). This also applies to Hub3-comparisons between heterogeneous and
homogeneous treatments for k = 24 (0.623 vs 0.614).24 Thus, Hypothesis
2(b) is not conﬁrmed.
Despite the fact that investment by Hub3 players is lower than the theo-
retically predicted level of 13, it is higher in the heterogeneous treatment than
in the homogeneous treatment.25 Moreover, the subgroup of Hub3 players
that are also low-cost players in Treatments IV, V and VI invest signiﬁcantly
more than the Hub3 players in Treatments I, II and II respectively.26 Hence,
overall, we ﬁnd some support for Hypothesis 2(c).
Table 3 shows that networks in the heterogeneous Treatment IV with
k = 10 have, on average, 4.965 directed links, which is more than theoretically
predicted (3 links, for all heterogeneous treatments) and statistically not
diﬀerent from the average number of links in the corresponding homogenous
Treatment I (4.842). Hence, we ﬁnd no support for Hypothesis 2(d), which
predicted a lower number of links in the homogeneous treatment.
Table 3 also reports equal aggregate investments in Treatment IV and
Table 6, with the exception of a dummy for c, as we focus on the heterogeneous sample
only.
24For k = 36 theory predicts that there should not be a diﬀerence, and this is indeed
conﬁrmed (0.465 vs 0.412).
25A t-test comparing the mean investments of Hub3 players in the heterogeneous with
the homogeneous treatment (see Table 5) is signiﬁcant with p = 0.077 (one-tailed).
26A Wilcoxon rank-sum and two-tailed t-test (unreported) show that the investment
levels of the subgroup of Hub3 players that are also low-cost players in Treatment IV are
signiﬁcantly higher (99% CI) than the investment levels of Hub3 players in the baseline
Treatment I. This also applies to respective comparisons of Hub3 investment levels between
Treatments II and V (95% CI), and between Treatments III and VI (99% CI).
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Treatment I.27 In addition, the OLS analysis presented in the last column
of Table 10 in Appendix II (Model 5) reveals that individual investment is
not signiﬁcantly higher for heterogeneous treatments: the coeﬃcient of a
dummy for the homogeneous treatments is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero. This also applies when we rerun Model 5 of Table 10 with Treatments
I and IV only (unreported). Overall, we do not ﬁnd any diﬀerence between
heterogeneous and homogeneous low-cost treatments, and therefore also no
support for Hypothesis 2(e).
Finally, we note that the theory predicts that with heterogeneous costs,
the aggregate investment must remain constant with respect to costs of link-
ing. An inspection of Table 3 reveals that aggregate investments are rising in
costs of linking, from 14 all the way to 19, as we increase the costs of linking
from k = 10 to k = 36. Thus the experiment with heterogenous costs clearly
violates this prediction of the theory.
Our experiments, both with the homogenous and the heterogenous costs,
present one consistent violation of the theoretical prediction: aggregate in-
vestments are rising in the costs of linking. The next section develops an
explanation for this violation.
4.3 Findings on aggregate investment
The results in the previous section revealed that, while the median subject
accesses the theoretically predicted investment (see Section 4.1), the aggre-
gate investment level is higher than yˆ = 12 and is increasing with linking
costs. This violates an important prediction of the theory (Hypothesis 1d).
We now propose a simple model to help us understand the patterns in ag-
gregate investment. We start by noting that in the original model of Galeotti
and Goyal (2010), players make their choices simultaneously. By contrast,
in the experiment, players make choices sequentially and repeatedly, and
there is an uncertain end point. Given these signiﬁcant departures from the
model, we interpret the consistency between the theoretical predictions and
the data as strong support for key trade-oﬀs faced by individuals in private
investments and linking. There is, however, one important dimension  ag-
gregate investment  on which there is clear diﬀerence between the theoretical
prediction and the experimental data. In what follows, we propose a simple
27Neither the medians (both 14 units) nor the means (15.386 for Treatment IV; 15.175
for Treatment I) are statistically diﬀerent (Wilcoxon rank-sum and t-test).
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notion of stability to explore the role of strategic posturing in a dynamic
setting.
The model we develop is an attempt at bridging the gap between the
static theoretical model and the possibilities of strategic posturing created
by the dynamic game being played in the experiment. Our model builds on
earlier work by Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007) on the stability of investment
behaviour on ﬁxed networks, and Page and Wooders (2009) and Dutta et al.
(2009) on the stability of network formation processes.
The main idea here is that, toward the end of the game, players explore
small and local moves to improve their payoﬀs. In this exploration they take
into account the possible response of other players but as time is short they
do not believe that it is worth working through the consequences of long
sequences of moves and counter moves. More formally, given a proﬁle s, a
player i asks if she can change her investment or her linking and if that can
conceivably improve her payoﬀs, given that possibly one other player may
have a chance to respond. A strategy proﬁle s is said to be stable if there
exists no small and local deviation that may be proﬁtable in this sense.
We start with an analysis of the stability of the equilibrium predictions
in the theoretical model. The ﬁrst observation is that a hub player has an
incentive to shade their investments: if the shading is very large peripheral
player(s) will best respond by deleting links but if the shading is small then
they will best respond by simply raising their investment correspondingly. In
this situation, the payoﬀs of the hub player will deﬁnitely increase. We have
thus shown that the equilibrium outcomes identiﬁed in Treatments I-III are
not stable in a dynamic setting
We now turn to the study of stable outcomes. Following on the above
argument, the next step is to develop bounds on the level of shading that
the hub-player can practice. Our analysis of these bounds is summarized as
follows:
Observation: Fix a strategy proﬁle s in which the network is a core-periphery
network with m hub players and n-m periphery players. Let xi denote invest-
ment by a hub-player and xj the investment by a periphery player. This
proﬁle is stable only if the investments respect the following restrictions:
xi =
k
c
+
z∗
m
; xj = yˆ − mk
c
− z∗,
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with
yˆ − (m+ 1) k
c
≤ z∗ ≤ yˆ − mk
c
.
We note an important feature of these investment restrictions: a hub player
accesses investments in excess of yˆ, while periphery players access investments
exactly equal to yˆ.
The key step is the derivation of the bounds on z and we present it here;
the rest of the derivation is presented in Appendix I. Consider the incentives
to reduce investments by the periphery: in the dynamic setting there is the
possibility that the hub player responds by raising her investment. We now
show that if z is small then the hub is accessing suﬃcient investments and will
not raise his investment in response. To check this let us take the investment
of this one periphery player all the way down to 0. The hub will still access
m
(
k
c
+
z
m
)
+ (n−m− 1)
(
yˆ − mk
c
− z
)
And it may be checked that this is in excess of yˆ if
z∗ ≤ yˆ − mk
c
(for n−m ≥ 2).
As periphery players get no incoming links, their investments must be
justiﬁed (in themselves), and there must be no incentive to form a link with
another peripheral player. As aggregate investments accessed by a peripheral
player are yˆ, we only need to check the no-new-link constraint, i.e., xj < k/c.
This is true if
z > yˆ − (m+ 1)k
c
Putting together these two conditions gives us the required restrictions on
z∗. We now illustrate the implication of these restrictions, for our diﬀerent
cost treatments. To ﬁx ideas we focus on the case of a single hub.
Consider the low cost case k = 10: we can compute the bounds for z
to be 8 < z < 10. The hub player sets minimum possible investment and
so we get xi = 10 and xj = 2. So aggregate investment is equal to 16. In
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the medium costs case, k = 24, the bounds for z are 2.4 < z < 7.2. The
hub player sets xi = 7.2 and xj = 4.8. So aggregate investment is equal to
21.6. Finally, consider the high cost case, k = 36. It is easy to compute that
−2.4 < z < 4.8. The hub player sets minimum possible z, i.e., z = 0. We
then get xi = 7.2 and xj = 4.8. So aggregate investment is equal to 21.6.
We can use similar methods to compute the bounds on z for outcomes with
multiple hub players. They are presented in the appendix and indicate that
aggregate investment will be lower in case there are multiple hubs.
Taken together, our computations demonstrate one, that aggregate in-
vestments in a stable outcome in the dynamic model can be larger than the
equilibrium investments in the original static model and two, that they are
increasing in linking costs. These two predictions are consistent with the
patterns observed in our experiment.
To close the circle, we now return to the data from our experiments
and show that an important prediction of this new model is also satisﬁed:
hubs typically overinvest relative to the static best response, while periphery
players roughly play a best response in investment levels.
Table 4 shows that in the baseline treatment the network is connected
in over 92.11% of the cases. Table 7 shows that in Treatments I and II the
hub does indeed over-invest relative to the best response given his neighbors'
choices, while the non-hubs choose actions roughly in line with their best
response.
 Table 7 here 
We conclude by showing that the investment shading practiced by the
hubs has large payoﬀ eﬀects. Table 8 presents data on payoﬀs of hubs and
peripheral players. Hubs earn signiﬁcantly more than peripheral players (99%
CI); this order of earnings reverses the ranking of equilibrium payoﬀs in the
static Galeotti-Goyal model!
 Table 8 here 
5 Conclusion
Individuals and organizations acquire information privately and also in-
vest in links with others to access information indirectly. This paper presents
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an experiment on the economic consequences of changes in the relative cost
of these two activities.
The experiment is based on a theoretical model of local public goods
and linking. We ﬁnd that a decline in linking costs can have large eﬀects.
Individual investments in local public goods are more dispersed and they are
accompanied by greater linking activity and hence, denser social networks.
Aggregate investment falls, but investment accessed by individuals remains
stable, due to increased networking. The overall eﬀect is a signiﬁcant increase
in individual utility and aggregate welfare.
Our experiment is conducted with 4 subjects. In future work, it would
be important to test the scope of the theory by conducting experiments on
signiﬁcantly lager groups.
References
[1] Aral, S. and D. Walker (2012). Identifying Inﬂuential and Susceptible
Members of Social Networks, Science, 337-341
[2] Bala, V. and Goyal, S., (2000). A Noncooperative Model of Network
Formation. Econometrica 68, 1181-1229.
[3] Benoˆıt, J., and Krishna, V. (1985). Finitely repeated games. Economet-
rica, 43, 4, 905-922.
[4] Bramoulle´, Y., and R. Kranton (2007). Public Goods in networks, Jour-
nal of Economic Theory, 135, 478-494.
[5] Burger, M., and V. Buskens (2009). Social Context and Network For-
mation: An Experimental Study. Social Networks 31, 63-75.
[6] Cassar, A., (2007). Coordination and Cooperation in Local, Random and
Small World Networks: Experimental Evidence. Games and Economic
Behavior 58, 209-230.
[7] Callander, S. and Plott, C., (2005). Principles of network development
and evolution: An experimental study. Journal of Public Economics 89,
1469-1495.
23
[8] Charness, G. and Corominas-Bosch, M., Frechette, G. R., (2007). Bar-
gaining and network structure: An experiment. Journal of Economic
Theory 136, 28-65.
[9] Charness, G., F. Feri, M. Mele´ndez-Jime´nez and M. Sutter, (2014) Ex-
perimental Games on Networks: Underpinnings of Behavior and Equi-
librium Selection. Econometrica, 82(5), 1615-1670
[10] Croson, R (2010). Public goods experiments, in Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics, edited by, S. Durlauf and L. Blume.
[11] Dolder, D. van, and V. Buskens (2014). Individual Choices in Dy-
namic Networks: An Experiment on Social Preferences. PloS ONE 9(4):
e92276
[12] Dutta, B., Ghosal, S., & Ray, D. (2005). Farsighted network formation.
Journal of Economic Theory, 122(2), 143-164.
[13] Falk, A., and Kosfeld, M., (2012). It's all about connections: Evidence
on network formation. Review of Network Economics 11(3), Article 2.
[14] Farrell, J., and M. Rabin (1996). Cheap Talk, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 10, 3, 103-118.
[15] Fischbacher, U., (2007). Z-Tree. Zuerich Toolbox for Ready-Made Eco-
nomic Experiments. Experimental Economics 10, 171-178.
[16] Frankort, H. T. W., J. Hagedoorn, and W. Letterie (2012). R&D Part-
nership Portfolios and the Inﬂow of Technological Knowledge. Industrial
and Corporate Change 21 (2), 50737.
[17] Galeotti, A., and S. Goyal, (2010). The Law of the Few. American Eco-
nomic Review 100, 1468-1492.
[18] Goeree, J. K., Riedl, A. and A. Ule, (2009). In Search of Stars: Net-
work Formation among Heterogeneous Agents. Games and Economic
Behavior 67, 445-466.
[19] Goyal, S., (1993), Sustainable communication networks, Tinbergen In-
stitute Discussion Paper, TI 93-250.
24
[20] Goyal, S., (2007), Connections: An Introduction to the Economics of
Networks. Princeton University Press.
[21] Holt, C., and S. Laury (2012). Voluntary Provision of Public Goods:
Experimental Results with Interior Nash Equilibria, forthcoming in the
Handbook of Experimental Economic Results, (eds) C. Plott and V.
Smith. New York: Elsevier Press.
[22] Kosfeld, M., (2004). Economic networks in the laboratory: A survey.
Review of Network Economics 3, 20-42.
[23] Ledyard, J (1995). Public Goods: a survey of experimental research, in
Handbook of Experimental Economics, edited by J. Kagel and A. Roth.
[24] Leeuwen, B. van, T. Oﬀerman and A. Schram (2013). Superstars Need
Social Beneﬁts: An Experiment on Network Formation. Tinbergen In-
stitute Discussion Paper 2013-112/I.
[25] Page, F. H., and Wooders, M. (2009). Strategic basins of attraction,
the path dominance core, and network formation games. Games and
Economic Behavior, 66(1), 462-487.
[26] Peitz, M., and J. Waldfogel (2012). The Oxford Handbook of the Digital
Economy, Oxford University Press.
[27] Rong, R. and D. Houser (2012). Emergent Star Networks with Ex Ante
Homogeneous Agents. George Mason University Interdisciplinary Cen-
ter for Economic Science Paper No. 12-33.
[28] Rosenkranz, S. and U. Weitzel, (2012). Network Structure and Strategic
Investments: An Experimental Analysis.Games and Economic Behavior
75, 898-920.
[29] Varian, H. (2010). Computer Mediated Transactions, American Eco-
nomic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 100, 2, 1-10.
25
Figure 1: Equilibrium conﬁgurations in Treatments I to VI.
Costs of information acquisition
k = 10 k = 24 k = 36
Homogeneous, c = 5 I II III
Heterogeneous, ci = 3 IV V VI
Table 1: Treatments in the experiment
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N* Mean SD Min Max
Age 152 21.368 2.454 17 31
Friends in the lab 152 0.711 1.183 0 6
Male 152 35.50% 0.48 0 1
Foreign nationality 152 38.20% 0.487 0 1
Investment (ﬁnal decision) 2736 4.401 3.364 0 30
In-degree (ﬁnal decision) 2736 1.03 1.09 0 3
Out-degree (ﬁnal decision) 2736 1.03 0.841 0 3
Linking decisions (per node, round) 38485 24.746 16.387 1 91
Investment decisions (per node, round) 96166 52.015 32.434 1 241
(N = 152 subjects multiplied by 18 non-trial rounds).
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of sample
Homogeneous, c = 5 Heterogeneous, ci = 3
Treatment I II III IV V VI
k = 10 k = 24 k = 36 k = 10 k = 24 k = 36
theory 5 4 3 3 3 3
Number of directed median 5 4 3 5 4 3
ties per group mean 4.842 3.833 3.684 4.965 3.746 3.658
SD (1.252) (3.611) (1.826) (1.545) (0.870) (1.356)
theory 12 12 12 13 13 13
Total investment median 14 17 19 14 17.5 19
per group mean 15.175 17.588 19.465 15.386 18.491 19.509
SD (4.502) (4.560) (6.444) (4.586) (4.876) (6.886)
theory 696-726 636-684 648 763 721 685
Total proﬁt median 680 636 611 698 645 621.5
per group mean 658.588 622.526 611.912 669.491 640.956 628.5
SD (54.843) (41.616) (56.702) (58.871) (37.813) (61.14)
N 114 114 114 114 114 114
theory 12 12 12 13 13 13
Individually median 12 12 12 13 13 13
accessed investment mean 12.693 12.993 12.879 12.833 13.564 13.355
SD (2.942) (3.611) (3.557) (2.957) (3.958) (4.141)
theory 144-194 130-180 164,198 169,196 169,184 169,172
Individual median 169 158 156.5 172.5 160 160
proﬁt mean 164.647 155.632 152.978 167.373 160.239 157.125
SD (20.209 ) (21.481) (23.915) (20.449) (20.809) (23.981)
N 456 456 456 456 456 456
Table 3: Descriptive statistics at the group level
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Figure 2: Distribution of investment available to individuals in Treatment I
(c=5, k=10) and Treatment IV (c=3, k=10)
Figure 3: Box plot investment versus in-degree
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Hub3 Hub2 Hub3 Hub2
Treatment IV Treatment IV Treatments IV-VI Treatment IV-VI
low-cost player 5.065*** 2.648*** 5.692*** 4.152***
[5.349] [3.506] [9.529] [8.968]
k = 10 0.65 1.254
[-0.352] [0.189]
k = 36 0.386 0.62
[-0.772] [-0.398]
Period 0.808 1.145 1.123 1.144
[-0.536] [0.603] [0.336] [0.390]
Session dummies yes yes yes yes
Period dummies yes yes yes yes
Constant 1.74 0.146 0.048 0.057
[0.116] [-0.709] [-1.026] [-0.962]
No. observations 456 456 1368 1368
No. clusters 114 114 342 342
Log Likelihood -186.224 -282.441 -508.682 -779.102
Pseudo R2 0.114 0.083 0.114 0.087
χ2 49.899 167.07 112.034 160.553
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table reports odds ratios; z-values in parentheses; heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator of
of variance; standard errors corrected for intra-network correlation.* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 6: Logistic estimation on the likelihood of being a hub (Treatment IV)
31
Homogeneous, c = 5 Heterogeneous, ci = 3
Hub2 I II III IV V VI
k = 10 k = 24 k = 36 k = 10 k = 24 k = 36
Hubs: investment 5.093 6.645 6.293 5.324 7.039 7.058
best-response 3.983 4.250 4.361 4.995 4.811 5.733
z-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.292 0.000 0.000
Non-hubs: investment 2.930 3.557 4.279 2.838 3.689 4.098
best-response 2.974 3.731 4.328 3.708 4.295 4.798
z-value 0.604 0.595 0.918 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hub3 I II III IV V VI
k = 10 k = 24 k = 36 k = 10 k = 24 k = 36
Hubs: investment 5.926 7.314 7.362 6.518 7.620 8.226
best-response 4.410 3.743 4.766 5.860 4.141 6.321
z-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.128 0.000 0.000
Non-hubs: investment 3.347 3.868 4.579 3.286 4.070 4.437
best-response 3.164 3.896 4.288 3.888 4.494 4.876
z-value 0.170 0.718 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000
The z-values correspond to Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, signiﬁcance is also conﬁrmed
in two-tailed t-tests.
Table 7: Best-response for hubs and non-hubs
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Appendix I
1. In Treatments I-III, aggregate investments in equilibrium are equal to 12.
Proof: The proof exploits the assumption that investments take integer
values and that n = 4. First, we prove that in equilibrium the network is
connected. Suppose it is not connected then we need to consider networks of
one, two, three (and four) isolated players and networks with disconnected
pairs. Observe that no network with a single isolated player is an equilibrium:
this is because the isolated player will optimally choose 12. But then from
Galeotti and Goyal (2010) we know that there must be only one hub, which
contradicts the hypothesis that the player is isolated. So we need to consider
the case of two disconnected pairs only. When k = 10 or 24, in each pair there
is at least one player who chooses 6 or more. But then the larger investing
player in one pair has an incentive to form a link with the larger investing
players in the other pair. When k = 36, it follows that in each pair the higher
investing player is choosing 8 or more. But then the higher investing player
in one pair has a strict incentive to form a link with the higher investing
player in the other pair.
So consider connected networks. If only one player invests then it follows
from optimality that this player must be investing 12. If only two players
are investing then it follows from arguments in Galeotti and Goyal (2010)
that neither is investing 12. So they must be connected to each other. This
implies from optimality of individual actions that each of them must access
exactly 12. Consider next the case that 3 players are investing. Again all of
them must be investing strictly less than 12. As everyone accesses 12, each
of them must access at least one other player. If a positive investing player
accesses all three then the sum total investments must equal 12. So in the
three investors case we have proved that the sum of investments must equal
12.
Finally, consider the case that all four players make positive investments.
We ﬁrst consider the case that a player with x is a leaf. Observe that in this
case there is a player with y such that x + y = 12, However, as the network
is connected y must have one other link with someone with investment z. So
there is a player who accesses x + y + z, where all investments are positive.
From optimality of individual investments it follows that x+ y+ z = 12, but
this is a contradiction. So no player is a leaf. Similarly, we can show that a
network in which a player has three links must imply that this player accesses
34
all investments, which must then be equal to 12. So the only possibility left
is that every player has two links. This means that the network is a ring.
This means that all players must make equal investments and sum of three
investments must equal 12. In other words, every player invests 4. This
is impossible if k = 24 or k = 36. If k = 10, then each player is strictly
better oﬀ cutting down own investment and linking with a new player. This
completes the proof. QED
2. In Treatments IV-VI, in equilibrium all high-cost players choose 0 invest-
ments.
Proof: The proof of connectedness is as in the previous result. So from now
on we restrict attention to connected networks.
We go through the diﬀerent cases with 1, 2, 3 and 4 contributors. Suppose
there is 1 contributor. This contributor cannot be the high-cost (H) player as
he will choose 12; but then the low-cost (L) player will raise his investment
to a positive amount so that total investment accessed is 13.
Next consider the case of two contributors. If both players are high cost
and contributing then neither can be contributing 12. But then it follows
from optimality of individual behavior that the sum of investments must be
12. But then an L player will have a strict incentive to increase investment
to 1. So consider the case where one investor is Hand the other is L. Again
it follows that the sum must be 13 and both players must access each other.
But then, the H player is accessing too much investment.
Consider next the case of 3 contributors. We need to separately consider
the case of three H players, 2 H players and 1 L player. Straightforward
arguments exploiting the fact that an L player must access at least 13 and
an active an H player must access exactly 12 imply imply that there is no
equilibrium like that.
Finally, consider the case of 4 contributors. Here we follow the line of
argument in the previous result. We start by showing that a player cannot
be peripheral in an equilibrium network. We then consider networks in which
no player is peripheral. Here we take up networks in which some player has
3 links. If this is an H player then it contradicts the requirement that an
H player must access exactly 12, while there is an L player who is accessing
exactly 13. Similarly, if the L player has 3 links then we need to consider a
range of networks with 3, 4, 5 and 6 links and in each case we can use integer
investments, and the requirement that the L player must access exactly 13,
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while the H player accesses exactly 12, to show that this cannot be sustained
in equilibrium. This leaves only the case in which every player has exactly
2 links. In the ring network, it can be checked that we run afoul of integer
constraints. So 4 contributors cannot be sustained in equilibrium. We are
left with only one option: one contributor who is of the low-cost type. QED
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Proof of Observation: We start with incentives of the hub player.
• Adding a link to hub player: this would simply lower payoﬀ by k and
is clearly unproﬁtable.
• Cutting a link to hub player: this can potentially raise payoﬀs by k.
• Increasing information acquisition: the hub player already accesses in-
vestments in excess yˆ. All other players are already connected to the
hub. So an increase in investment can only lead to lower investments
by others and thus lower utility.
• Reducing information acquisition: we know that lower investments
than yˆ − (m + 1)k/c will mean that periphery players invest in ex-
cess of k/c and this will lead to switches between self investment and
links with other peripheral players, thus destroying the core-periphery
network.
We next consider incentive of the periphery player:
• Severing the link to hub: this will clearly reduce payoﬀs since xi > k/c
and aggregate investments accessed by periphery player are yˆ.
• Adding a link to non-hub player: this is clearly unproﬁtable as xj < k/c.
It will also not raise investments of the new neighbor as this player will
then accessing investments in excess of yˆ.
• Reducing investments: this is unproﬁtable as total investments accessed
are yˆ and lower investment will not induce greater investment from
current hub contacts. This was explained in the main text of the paper
and deﬁnes the upper bound for z.
• Increasing investment: this is not by itself proﬁtable as periphery player
is accessing yˆ in current proﬁle. So the only incentive would be a link
from a periphery player. However, such a link would lead to that
new contact lowering investment to 0. So again increasing investment
cannot be proﬁtable.

We now compute the bounds for z for the diﬀerent cost of linking and for
the diﬀerent core-periphery networks. The case with single hub has already
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been presented in the main text. We now complete the other cases, k=24
and m=2: The bounds for z are −2.4 < z < 2.4. So investment by a hub
player is xi = 4.8 and by the periphery player is xj = 2.4. This means that
aggregate investment is 14.4.
Turning to the low cost case k = 10. For m = 2, we ﬁnd the bounds for z
are 6 < z < 8. The investment by the hub is xi = 5 and the investment by
the peripheral player is xj = 2. This means that the aggregate investment is
14.
Appendix II
Session Treatments
1 I II III IV V VI
(k = 10, c = 5) (k = 24, c = 5) (k = 36, c = 5) (k = 10, ci = 3) (k = 24, ci = 3) (k = 36, ci = 3)
2 III II I VI V IV
(k = 36, c = 5) (k = 24, c = 5) (k = 10, c = 5) (k = 36, ci = 3) (k = 24, ci = 3) (k = 10, ci = 3)
3 IV V VI I II III
(k = 10, ci = 3) (k = 24, ci = 3) (k = 36, ci = 3) (k = 10, c = 5) (k = 24, c = 5) (k = 36, c = 5)
4 VI V IV III II I
(k = 36, ci = 3) (k = 24, ci = 3) (k = 10, ci = 3) (k = 36, c = 5) (k = 24, c = 5) (k = 10, c = 5)
5 I II III IV V VI
(k = 10, c = 5) (k = 24, c = 5) (k = 36, c = 5) (k = 10, ci = 3) (k = 24, ci = 3) (k = 36, ci = 3)
6 III II I VI V IV
(k = 36, c = 5) (k = 24, c = 5) (k = 10, c = 5) (k = 36, ci = 3) (k = 24, ci = 3) (k = 10, ci = 3)
7 IV V VI I II III
(k = 10, ci = 3) (k = 24, ci = 3) (k = 36, ci = 3) (k = 10, c = 5) (k = 24, c = 5) (k = 36, c = 5)
8 VI V IV III II I
(k = 36, ci = 3) (k = 24, ci = 3) (k = 10, ci = 3) (k = 36, c = 5) (k = 24, c = 5) (k = 10, c = 5)
Table 9: Sequence of treatments
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Baseline Treatment IV Homogeneous Heterogeneous Full
Treatment I ci = 3, k = 10 Treatments I-III Treatments IV-VI Sample
in-degree 1.367*** 1.574*** 1.316*** 1.528*** 1.413***
[13.501] [12.183] [18.549] [17.893] [25.094]
k = 10 -0.868** -1.328*** -0.926**
[-2.493] [-3.581] [-2.364]
k = 36 0.581 0.204 0.56
[1.565] [0.506] [1.423]
Homogeneous costs -0.095
[-0.753]
Round -0.088 -1.99 0.017 0.091 -0.079
[-0.510] [-0.735] [0.100] [0.496] [-0.376]
Session dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Period dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 1.911*** 1.770 2.962*** 3.048*** 3.325***
[2.805] [1.927] [6.241] [5.803] [9.473]
No. observations 456 456 1368 1368 2736
No. clusters 114 114 342 342 684
R2(adj.) 15.261 13.090 16.953 16.467 26.872
F 0.340 0.328 0.214 0.227 0.221
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table reports t-values in parentheses; heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator of variance; standard errors corrected
for intra-network correlation; period and session dummies incl. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 10: OLS regressions with individual investment as dependent variable,
Treatments I - VI
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Treatment I Treatment II Treatment III Treatment IV Treatment V Treatment VI
c = 5, k = 10 c = 5, k = 24 c = 5, k = 36 ci = 3, k = 10 ci = 3, k = 24 ci = 3, k = 36
Data
Equilibria 1 4 2 2 0 0
(0.8%) (3.4%) (1.7%) (1.7%)
Equilibrium 29 34 17 5 22 14
structures (25.4%) (29.7%) (14.9%) (4.4%) (19.29%) (12.28%)
Chance
Equilibria < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01
(< 0.001%) (< 0.001%) (< 0.001%) (< 0.001%) (< 0.001%) (< 0.001%)
Equilibrium 5.79 3.56 1.78 0.44 0.44 0.44
structures (5%) (3.1%) (1.5%) (0.4%) (0.4%) (0.4%)
Total 114 114 114 114 114 114
Table reports number of observations and % of total (in parentheses).
Table 11: Frequencies and percentages of equilibria and equilibrium struc-
tures
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Experimental Laboratory for Sociology and Economics 
 
- Instructions - 
 
Please read the following instructions carefully. These instructions are equal for all the 
participants. The instructions state everything you need to know in order to participate 
in the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. One of the 
experimenters will approach you in order to answer your question.  
 
You can earn money by means of earning points during the experiment. The number of 
points that you earn depends on your own choices and the choices of other participants. 
At the end of the experiment, the total number of points that you earn during the 
experiment will be exchanged at an exchange rate of: 
 
200 points = 1 Euro 
 
The money you earn will be paid out in cash at the end of the experiment without other 
participants being able to see how much you earned. Further instructions on this will 
follow in due time. During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with 
other participants. Turn off your mobile phone and put it in your bag. Also, you may 
only use the functions on the screen that are necessary to carry out the experiment. 
Thank you very much. 
 
 
- Overview of the experiment - 
 
The experiment consists of six scenarios. Each scenario consists again of one trial 
round and three paid rounds (altogether 24 rounds of which 18 are relevant for your 
earnings).  
 
In all scenarios you will be grouped with three other randomly selected participants. At 
the beginning of each of the 24 rounds, the groups and the positions within the groups 
will be randomly changed. The participants that you are grouped with in one round are 
very likely different participants from those you will be grouped with in the next round. 
It will not be revealed with whom you were grouped at any moment during or after the 
experiment. 
 
The participants in your group will be shown as circles on the screen (see Figure 1). 
You are displayed as a blue circle, while the other participants are displayed as black 
circles. You will be able to connect to one or more other participants in your group 
during each round. By clicking on one of the other participants, you become connected 
to this other participant. An arrow appears to indicate the connection. By clicking again 
on the participant the arrow and, thus, the connection is removed again. You are also 
connected to another participant if this other participant clicks once on you. The 
participant on whose side a one-sided arrow starts has initiated this connection and has 
to pay some points for this connection. If both participants have clicked for a specific 
connection a two-headed arrow appears and both participants need to pay points for this 
connection. All participants that are connected to you by any kind of arrow will be 
called your neighbors. Hence, in Figure 1 the participants with “75” and with “118” in 
their circles are your neighbors. 
 2 
 
Figure 1: Explanation of screen elements 
 
 
You can earn points in a round by investing, but investing also costs points. The points 
you receive in the end depend on your own investment and the investments of your 
neighbors. By clicking on one of the two buttons at the bottom of the screen you 
increase or decrease your investment. At the end of the round, you receive the amount 
of points that is shown on the screen at that moment in time. In other words, your final 
earnings only depend on the situation at the end of every round.  
 
Each round lasts between 105 and 135 seconds. The end will be at an unknown and 
random moment in this time interval. Therefore, different rounds will not last equally 
long. 
 
The points you will receive can be seen as the top number in your blue circle. The 
points others will receive are indicated as the top number in the black circles of others. 
Next to this, the size of the circles changes with the points that you and the other 
participants will receive: a larger circle means that the particular participant receives 
more points. The bottom number in the circles indicates the amount invested by that 
participant. 
 
Remarks: 
 It can occur that there is a time-lag between your click and the changes of the 
numbers on the screen. One click is enough to change a connection or to change 
your investment by one unit. A subsequent click will not be effective before the 
previous click is effectuated. 
 Therefore wait until a connection is changed or your investment is adapted 
before making further changes! 
YOU 
Click on other circles 
to initiate or remove 
connections 
Click on red 
buttons to change 
investments 
 3 
 
- Your earnings - 
 
Now we explain in detail how the number of points that you earn depends on the 
investments and the connections. Read this carefully. Do not worry if you find it 
difficult to grasp immediately. We also present an example with calculations below. 
Next to this, there is a trial round for each scenario to gain experience with how 
connections and investments affect your earnings.  
 
In all scenarios, the points you receive at the end of each round depend in a similar way 
on two factors: 
 
1. Every connection that you initiated yourself costs a given number of points 
(this will be either 10, 24 or 36). 
2. Every unit that you invest yourself will cost you 5 points most of the time; in 
some scenarios, there is one participant in your group (maybe yourself) for 
whom every unit investment costs only 3 points. This participant will be 
displayed with an additional square around the circle (see Figure 3).  
3. You earn points for each unit that you invest yourself and for each unit that 
your neighbors invest (the earnings related to a neighbor’s investments do 
not depend on whether an arrow points toward yourself, toward the 
neighbor, or in both directions). 
 
If you sum up all units of investment of yourself and your neighbors, the following table 
gives you the points that you earn from these investments: 
 
Your investment plus 
your neighbors’ 
investments 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Points 0 28 54 78 100 120 138 154 168 180 190 
 
Your investment plus 
your neighbors’ 
investments 
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
Points 198 204 208 210 211 212 213 214 215  216 217 
 
The higher the total investments, the lower are the points earned from an additional unit 
of investment. Beyond an investment of 21, you earn one extra point for every 
additional unit invested by you or one of your neighbors. 
 
Note: if your and your neighbors’ investments add up to 12 or more, earnings 
increase by less than 5 points for each additional unit of investment. 
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- Example shown in Figure 2 - 
Suppose 
1. initiating connections costs 24 points in this scenario; 
2. you initiated one connection with one participant and one other participant 
initiated a connection with you;  
3. you invested 2 units; 
4. one of your neighbors invested 3 units and the other neighbor invested 4 units. 
 
Then you have to pay 24 points for the connection you initiated and 2 times 5 = 10 
points for your own investments. Therefore, your total costs are 34 points. 
 
The investments that you profit from are your own plus your neighbors’ investments: 2 
+ 3 + 4 = 9 (see bottom numbers in the circles from you and your neighbors on the right 
and on the left). In the table you can see that your earnings from this are 180 points. 
 
In total, you would receive 180 − 34 = 146 points if this would be the situation at the 
end of the round. Figure 2 shows this example as it would appear on the screen. The 
investment of the fourth participant in your group (at the bottom of the screen) does not 
affect your earnings. In the trial round before each scenario, you will have time to get 
used to how the points you receive change with investments. 
 
The participant on the left has initiated two connections, invests in 3 units himself and 
profits from 3 + 2 + 1 = 6 units in total. Therefore, this participant receives in this 
situation 138 (see table) − 2  24 − 3  5 = 75 points. 
 
Figure 2: Numerical example 
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- Scenarios - 
 
All rounds are basically the same. The things that change between scenarios are:  
1. The costs for a connection will be 10, 24, or 36 points. 
2. There might be one participant who pays only 3 points per unit of investment. 
This participant is marked with an additional square. In Figure 3, this is the 
participant on the left. This participant earns 6 points more than in Figure 2 
because he pays 3  2 = 6 points less for his three units of investments, which 
brings his total earnings to 138 − 2  24 − 3  3 = 81.  
 
When a new scenario starts, you will get a message on the screen that describes the new 
scenario. Please read these messages carefully. As indicated before each scenario starts 
with a trial round. At the top of the screen you can also see when you are in a trial 
round. Paying rounds are indicated by “ROUND” while trial rounds are indicated by 
“TRIAL ROUND”. 
 
Figure 3: Second example 
 
 
 
- Questionnaire - 
 
After the 24 rounds you will be asked to fill in a questionnaire. Please take your time to 
fill in this questionnaire accurately. In the mean time your earnings will be counted. 
Please remain seated until the payment has taken place.  
